Special Forces in Unconventional Warfare

by Colonel Michael R. Kershner, US Army

Quite possibly, unconventional warfare (UW) is the most misunderstood form of US military operations. It is not simply a variant of guerrilla warfare; guerrilla warfare, unconventional assisted recovery, information operations (IO) and information support, subversion, and sabotage play roles in unconventional warfare.

Joint doctrine defines unconventional warfare as a "broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominately conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities and evasion and escape."[1] This broad definition supports the entire spectrum of UW activities.

The US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) recently conducted a series of UW seminars to encourage the Special Forces (SF) to return to its roots and be the world's most relevant special force. Unconventional warfare has always been Special Forces' primary mission; all other tasks are subsets of this overarching mission.

Because of its specialized training, Special Forces is recognized as the Army's most relevant force. As the Army grapples with structure, doctrine and operations of the Interim Force and the Objective Force, Special Forces must remain relevant throughout the 21st century.

The World as a Minefield

If today's world is any guide, tomorrow's world will be volatile, uncertain, complex and dangerous. There will be increasingly ambiguous political and military situations populated by nontraditional enemies, including well-funded narcoterrorists, criminal enterprises, militias and private armies. Racial, ethnic, economic and ideological differences will make effective government increasingly difficult. The weaker those governments are, the sooner fault lines will affect their ability to provide for their citizens' welfare or keep them in subjugation, as is often the case. Dysfunctional governments increasingly lead to porous borders, government corruption and other opportunities for exploitation. As governments fail, anarchy, tribalism and reactionary authoritarian regimes will fill power vacuums.

While tomorrow's threats are unpredictable, they almost certainly will not be peer competitors. The likelihood of any nation coupling military ascendancy with dominant economic strength is virtually nil. That does not mean the United States is more secure than in the past. Its strength and its open democratic society provide opportunities to enemies. For example, when Iranian dictator Saddam Hussein attempted to go toe-to-toe with US forces in terrain similar to that at the US National Training Center (NTC), other nations watched his inevitable defeat and learned appropriate lessons. Rarely does a nation face such an obliging enemy. The United States must not assume that the next adversary will be as cooperative.

The terms *du jour* for future threats are "asymmetric" and "asynchronous."[2] What the terms really mean is "unconventional." The United States has the world's premier UW weapon—the US Army Special Forces. The mere potential of forces trained and prepared to conduct unconventional warfare is a warning and strategic deterrent to US enemies.

Today's unsettled environment, which in the future will be even more unsettled, is the milieu in which unconventional warfare thrives, and the environment into which Special Forces will deploy. On any given day, more than 750 soldiers conduct an average of 61 missions in 39 countries.[3] This ubiquitous involvement ensures Special Forces' continued relevance and has earned its soldiers the nickname "Global Scouts."[4]

Given their broad and complex missions, SF soldiers are arguably involved daily in unconventional warfare. The Army's last conventional conflict occurred during Operation *Desert Storm*. More than 50 identifiable UW incidents have occurred during 1999 and 2000 alone, demonstrating the relevance of UW expertise.[5]

Originally, Special Forces was designed for 1950s-era unconventional warfare, taking as its model the Office of Strategic Services' Jedburgh teams that operated during World War II.[6] During the revitalization of special operations during the 1980s, the Army focused on the Soviet threat to Western Europe. To ensure its relevance during the Cold War, Army Special Forces assumed a large role in direct-action and special reconnaissance activities.

With the Soviet Union's demise, direct-action and special reconnaissance functions have been eclipsed. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) have become increasingly important. Special Forces has assumed an increasing number of foreign internal defense missions to support the Army and shape the strategic environment.[7]

Special Forces—Special Skills

As the world becomes increasingly unsettled and volatile, Special Forces must be well prepared for

unconventional warfare. By law, only US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) forces are authorized to conduct unconventional warfare.[8] Of all USSOCOM forces, the Special Forces is the most prepared to conduct unconventional warfare in its broadest terms, including but not limited to guerrilla warfare.

Soldiers who conduct unconventional warfare are highly trained, skilled and mature. They have excellent problem-solving skills and mental agility in the most fluid situations. Their flexibility and adaptability are unparalleled. Foreign-language capability, area and cultural expertise, and excellent interpersonal skills complement base-line requirements. Special Forces soldiers understand the situation of those they train or contact, and they comprehend the relevant social, economic and political milieu. Special Forces' primary peacetime purpose in multiple overseas deployments is to ensure that the required expertise is present when crises appear.

An SF soldier's language expertise should not be confused with a linguist's. Special Forces soldiers are trained to exchange ideas and train others on complex skills in austere environments. Focusing on unconventional warfare ensures that SF soldiers are prepared for their most difficult mission. The ability to conduct special reconnaissance and direct action is embedded in the requirement to conduct unconventional warfare. While Special Forces can do these missions unilaterally, it is the only US military force that can teach direct-action and special reconnaissance skills to surrogate or indigenous forces. This unique ability sets SF soldiers apart.

Unconventional warfare skills apply in every operational environment from MOOTW to major theater war. Unconventional warfare also gives the theater commander in chief (CINC) or joint task force (JTF) commander flexible options with which to exert pressure throughout the spectrum of operations.

Special Forces is discreet; neither large troop formations nor large logistics footprints are required. Its contributions to information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement and full-dimensional protection support Army Vision 2010 and 2020 and Joint Vision 2020 and occur throughout engagement, crisis response, warfighting and transition back to engagement.

While Special Forces uses various means to gather information and intelligence, human intelligence makes the greatest impact on information superiority. Through close working contacts and formal relationships, Special Forces fills many gaps in the conventional force commander's situational understanding, particularly in the more complex areas of intention and motivation. Human intelligence helps the conventional force commander make timely decisions and provides the foundation for successful psychological warfare, thus ensuring the most effective use of scarce resources.

The information superiority Special Forces provides also helps the JTF commander achieve dominant maneuver. Leveraging surrogate forces or indigenous forces that Special Forces has advised greatly enhances maneuver dominance. Such force multipliers can be extraordinarily advantageous to the maneuver-force commander, whether used in deception operations or as full-maneuver units. Special Forces, acting either unilaterally or through indigenous or surrogate forces, can also greatly enhance information superiority in urban terrain, where the effectiveness of massed fires or standoff delivery systems is greatly reduced. Special Forces units or agents can greatly limit collateral damage inherent in such firepower by employing laser target designators and other sensor-to-shooter technology to permit precise engagements. These technologies lower risk to delivery platforms and direct standoff ordnance to such elusive targets as individual tanks and specific windows. Information superiority also enables the precise targeting for psychological warfare.

Special Forces' contribution to full-dimensional protection is embedded in its ability to leverage information and intelligence gathered from indigenous contacts. Special Forces' unique ability to work in, among and through the local populace and resistance movements is indispensable. Precise infiltration techniques insert SF soldiers among the enemy they are to engage, dramatically increasing available intelligence. Direct-action operations, as well as sabotage, subversion, and offensive information operations and information support, improve the JTF commander and theater CINC's understanding of the battle space and make it increasingly difficult for the enemy to achieve an equivalent understanding. By increasing the enemy's friction and fog of war, Special Forces reduces the speed and effectiveness of the enemy's decision making while improving the friendly force commander's. In fact, the judicious and early application of Special Forces in UW roles might eliminate or greatly reduce the need to commit general-purpose forces.

Cultivating relationships and identifying key personalities—or engagement—is a continual SF mission. The combination of thorough study and boots-on-the-ground presence engages Special Forces every day in prospective UW environments. One of the most challenging aspects of unconventional warfare is that SF units are regularly involved. US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne) currently leads the effort to ensure maximum UW support to special operations commands that support theater CINCs.

Updating and Revitalizing UW Doctrine

Unconventional warfare's dynamic and versatile nature ensures Special Forces' relevance. However, the misperception that unconventional warfare is guerrilla warfare and nothing else contributes to its current neglect. Unconventional warfare doctrine is outdated, and UW training is limited.[9] Current doctrine still refers to unconventional warfare as being conducted in seven phases.[10] This concept needs to be reevaluated; it is more appropriate to describe unconventional warfare in terms of US Army doctrinal phases—engagement, crisis response, warfighting

and return to engagement.

The Army is revising and updating doctrine to reflect current requirements and capabilities. As UW flexibility and usefulness become increasingly apparent, mission guidance will become more focused, as will training. Lessons learned are not now found in training after-action reports; they come from after-action reports by forces actively involved in UW operations. This information reservoir should not be limited to US experiences; it should include Russian operations in Chechnya, Australian operations in East Timor and other UW activities throughout the world.

Unconventional warfare is being revitalized in a number of ways. The Special Forces Qualification Course is reemphasizing UW language and cultural training. Combat training centers are also integrating unconventional warfare at the National Training Center and, to a limited extent, at the JRTC at Fort Polk, Louisiana.

Tables of organization and equipment for SF groups are based on 1980s missions and must be reevaluated for current UW missions. Special Forces must be fully able to conduct its share of counterterrorism, counterproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and information operations missions.

While technology's potential contributions to unconventional warfare are important, its essential ingredient is the Special Forces soldier. From this highly trained warrior's unique capabilities flows all other UW capabilities. Unconventional warfare's diversity makes it a dynamic discipline. To extract unconventional warfare's maximum advantage, the Army must focus on the unique soldiers who achieve that advantage.

The concept of unconventional warfare as Special Forces' primary mission and source of all other core tasks might seem radical, but it is simply a conceptual framework for analyzing current mission sets. The US Army Special Operations Command mission analysis defines core tasks without greatly changing accepted definitions.[11] What is different is characterizing tasks such as direct-action, special reconnaissance and foreign internal defense as subsets of unconventional warfare. Solid UW training will ensure that US Army soldiers will remain the world's most relevant and well-prepared asymmetric warriors. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Joint Publication 1-02, *The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office (GPO), 23 March 1994 as amended through 6 April 1999), 713.
2. LTG Patrick M. Hughes, "Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead," prepared statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 February 1999, Washington, DC, <www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990202-hughes.html>.
3. Command Brief, US Army Special Forces Command (Airborne), [location and date unknown], 2000.
4. GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, "Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead" [publishing data not available], 2.
5. See Major Messing and William Shingleton, "National Defense Council Foundation: World Conflict List 1999," <www.ndcf.org/Conflict_List/World99.html>.
6. COL Aaron Bank, *From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1986), 149-59.
7. National Military Strategy, chapter 2, "The Strategic Environment: Opportunities and Challenges," <www.dtic.mil/jcs/nms/strategi.htm>.
8. *US Code*, Title 10, Section 167, "Unified Combatant Command for Special Operations Forces," <www4.law.Cornell.edu/uscode/>, January 2000.
9. See US Army Field Manual 31-20, *Doctrine for Special Forces Operation* (Washington, DC: GPO, April 1990).
10. Ibid., 9-5.
11. US Army Special Operations Command, "Mission Area Analysis for POM FY 02-07" (Fort Bragg, NC: January 1999).

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Dominant Warrior: An Objective Force at War in 2015

by Lieutenant Colonel Bo Barbour, US Army, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Bill Hix, US Army

It was dawn, 26 April 2016, in the mountains of Southwest Asia. The initial invasion had not been "textbook," but it was progressing satisfactorily. A decade of preparation, founded on a deliberate modernization program and careful analyses of previous failures, was now paying off. The New Independent Republic (NIR) was making a rapid strike to the north to control the headwaters that fed the life-giving rivers in this water-starved region. Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawn's corps was fighting a determined but manageable opponent as he moved to link up with special operations and airborne forces holding critical dams.

Fawn was on a tight time line; a US-led international response was almost assured. The NIR's strategic calculus estimated a time horizon of five to 10 days before he must have secured his objectives, deployed into a web defensive posture and prepared to seek stalemate. Indeed, except for a supporting corps to the southwest, NIR's remaining armed forces and the nation were mobilizing into a strategic defensive posture designed to marginalize the many US strengths. Fawn had to press on; he had a schedule to meet.

Lieutenant General Lawrence Shulman, commander of the US Army's first Objective Force corps, was watching Fawn's progress on his command display even as Shulman's headquarters and first division were closing. The US Army's mentally and physically agile forces—the end state of Army Transformation—were twice as lethal and had about half the deployment and logistic footprint of previous US armed forces. Deploying via a combination of airlift, self-deploying transport rotorcraft and high-speed sealift, these forces had conducted en route planning and rehearsals and, on closing into the theater, were ready to conduct spoiling attacks that would foil Fawn's tight time lines.

Closing the US first brigade-size force, and self-deploying lift aviation within 96 hours with the rest of the division closing in an additional 24 hours, caught Fawn by surprise.

Also, he was not aware that Shulman's second division was close behind. While not decisive in his mind—he was more concerned with the US Army's ability to close five divisions in 30 days and the probable coalition that these divisions would underpin—Fawn knew his time lines were now compressing, but he did not realize how rapidly compressed they would become.

The US Army Objective-Force division and its sister division were not just arriving as a deterrent or to wait for a buildup. Shulman swung his forces into action as soon as they closed. These forces were designed to be combat-ready off the ramp of their force-projection platforms.

Shulman's first two divisions struck deep, disrupting Fawn's lines of communications and support and follow-on echelons. Operational maneuver in depth, with shaping air interdiction and joint fires, ripped the rear out of Fawn's corps. Unprepared for the attack's timing, direction, speed and decisiveness, Fawn could not secure his initial objectives. He was no longer fighting to win; he was fighting to prevent defeat.

With the joint defending divisions' linear and conventional defense forming an anvil, Shulman's corps (minus) exploited the air dimension to create a mobile, lethal and survivable combined arms hammer that struck into Fawn's flanks and rear. Using reachback, Shulman's forces employed joint strike assets with their own combat power to simultaneously sever lines of communication, destroy rear-echelon forces and attack the NIR's rear divisions, which resulted in the early culmination of the NIR offensive.[1]

Fawn had lost his ability to influence events. The objective—taking the dams and declaring the futility of US forces bleeding to death for the sake of water—was passing. Fawn did not know what to do; his force was being overcome and dislocated by the US forces' mobility.

Army Transformation Wargame 2000

The preceding vignette illustrates the operational demands and capabilities the US Army examined during the first Army Transformation Wargame (ATWG), which is a strategic-level war game that increases national awareness about Army needs for the 21st century. Held at the Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, from 30 April to 5 May 2000, the war game provided a full range of insights into the demands that strategic and operational environments will place on the Army. Using a projected future setting, a compelling scenario and a diverse team of multiservice, interagency and multinational players, the war game presented Army capabilities in future major theater warfare.

ATWG 2000 is a key research instrument to explore future strategic and operational environments and their demands on the Objective Force. The ATWG has grown out of three years of research war-gaming experience centered on the Army After Next project. Beginning with the 2000 war game, this effort directly focused on gaining insights that form Objective-Force development as part of the Army transformation campaign plan. The war-gaming effort will be an iterative process over the next several years to help illuminate key transformation decisions in 2003.

The ATWG focused on three principal themes during the game: Why an Army? Why this Army? What are the compelling warfighting insights for the Army of 2015? The ATWG's research results provide insights for a strategically deployable land force capable of advanced full-dimensional operations when employed with other equally capable joint forces.

The ATWG examined contemporary, transformed interim and objective Army units. Deploying such a force would enable a theater commander in chief (CINC) to seize the initiative, deny the enemy an opportunity to set the pace, preserve options and ultimately set the conditions for decisive operations. Also highlighted were two revolutionary capabilities—the future combat system (FCS) and the future tactical rotorcraft (FTR). The war game also explored developing capabilities in command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), fires and other operational aspects. The scenario and war game addressed the following focus areas:

- Strategic and operational environments.
- Strategic and operational demands.
- The strategic value of land power.
- Full-spectrum dominance.
- Strategic responsiveness.
- Objective Force organizational and operational concepts.
- Joint interdependence.
- Coalition operations.
- Active and Reserve Components integration.

The ATWG explored a series of vignettes that addressed 21st-century crisis-response challenges; decisive operations and war termination; and the implications of a responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal and sustainable Army. Within the context of a major theater war, each vignette was "fought" by two panels led by two senior joint leaders: LTG William G. Carter III, USA, retired, and LTG Paul K. Van Riper, USMC, retired. Former CINCs and joint leaders, including a former Air Force vice chief, mentored the two panels. Experts from military, applicable interagency and selected industry disciplines rounded out the teams.

The war game examined the full spectrum of operational demands within a major theater war context. In the first player move, the transition from engagement to crisis-response operations challenged players to examine coalition building and provide strategically responsive forces. The subsequent shaping operations focused on:

- Surging to achieve and maintain information dominance.
- Seizing, protecting and retaining entry points.
- Denying the enemy a coherent defensive "set" in seized areas.
- Limiting and beginning to "roll back" the operational exclusion zone.

The ability to surge deployment and set favorable conditions for decisive warfighting operations was critical to success. The capability to project an Army combat brigade in 96 hours and a division in 120 hours

greatly expanded CINC options for shaping operations early.

In the second war game move, the rapid transition to decisive warfighting operations tasked players with defeating hostile forces and seizing control of disputed areas. Deploying five Army divisions in 30 days generated rapid momentum that dramatically limited the adversary's options and allowed the joint-force commander to:

- Project an integrated joint and combined force.
- Achieve air, sea and space dominance.
- Secure open terrain, fix enemy forces, degrade functional coherence and achieve operational dominance.
- Begin gaining tactical control of enemy forces.
- Rapidly transition to stability and support operations.

In the final move, players examined complex postconflict operations. As some combat operations continued, acts of sabotage became problematic, and the surge of humanitarian support tasks required thorough integration of interagency and nongovernment organizations.

Issues Raised

The war game highlighted a number of issues at strategic and operational levels. First, the conventional warfighting capability, the embodiment of national commitment and multinational commitment drawn from Army employment, remains a compelling aspect of future national power. The Army provides unique decisive capabilities to the joint team before, during and after a crisis. The ability to cement coalitions in peace and war is an increasingly important Army core competence.

Objective Force capabilities gave the National Command Authority (NCA) and warfighting CINC an expanded range of options for engagement, crisis response, warfighting and stability and support operations. In addition, the war game determined that the range of mission profiles, multidimensional threats and terrain were key underpinnings of the future landscape that compel transformation to Objective-Force capabilities in order to retain overmatch and to ensure decisive victory. National security participants validated future conditions by highlighting the following:

- Objective Force conventional warfighting capabilities are key to achieving decisive and enduring conflict resolution.
- Army forces provide unique capabilities to build and sustain coalitions.
- Congressional members will play a greater part in decisions to employ forces.
- Media coverage is increasing in the developing world.
- People and nations with nonsupportive points of view can access US public opinion.
- Nongovernment organizations have political influence.
- The technology-based global economy is sensitive to disruption.
- Collateral damage incurs legal and commercial liabilities.
- Building international legitimacy can bring international constraints on operations.

During the war game, employing land power early in crisis response deterred and stabilized the conflict by precluding the adversary from rapidly achieving operational objectives. This outcome required a joint, early application of force with the clear signal that overwhelming decisive force was rapidly building momentum. The capability to project a combat brigade in 96 hours, an Army division in 120 hours and five divisions in 30 days created an overwhelming challenge for the adversary. Such strategic responsiveness limited the aggressor's options to a brief operational offensive followed by a strategic defense. Then, his only choices were rapidly suing for peace or accepting his force's disintegration. This result illustrated the synergy of strategic responsiveness and full-spectrum dominance in the Objective Force.

At the operational level, the war game demonstrated the potential power of simultaneous buildup and execution vice sequentially applying service-specific capabilities. Simultaneously applying joint force capabilities early allowed US and coalition partners to more rapidly initiate the fight on favorable terms, seize the initiative, set the operations' pace and timing, build momentum and achieve decision.

Both panels, fighting independent Red teams, exploited this advantage early in the campaign. Carter's team employed the brigade that arrived within 96 hours with a US Marine Corps expeditionary brigade to secure key ports and options for follow-on operations. Thus, the Army and USMC team used its complementary capabilities to seize the initiative.[2]

Van Riper's team found similar utility, designing the operations described in the opening vignette. As Van Riper observed, "They were the only forces that could get engaged [so quickly.] Equipped with the FCS and FTR to transport them, the objective forces were able to combine the firepower of the heavy mechanized forces with the speed of light air assault forces."[3] Early-arriving forces also provided a unique capability to build and sustain a coalition with allied forces in theater.[4]

Even as the first joint forces rapidly altered conditions to wrest the initiative from the NIR, the rest of the joint force was promptly closing. As these forces postured to exploit joint shaping operations and initiate decisive operations, the operationally agile Army forces quickly repositioned within the theater, splitting the enemy's focus and dislocating his force.

The Vignette Continues

Schulman's corps exploited high-speed intratheater air and sealift along with his own vertical maneuver capability. This maneuver immediately created a second front that split the NIR and plugged escape routes. Shulman's objective divisions were the Army's most deployable, responsive and lethal divisions—versatile across the spectrum of conflict, survivable in combat and sustainable anywhere in the world. During the conflict's opening stages, Schulman's objective airborne corps demonstrated its revolutionary ability to deploy strategically and rapidly influence events. Now he would reinforce this lesson.

The Objective Force airborne corps struck against Fawn's corps in the initial invasion and proved it could strike anywhere on the battlefield, attacking and defeating NIR forces twice its size. Fawn asked his

chief of staff the same question he had asked for the past 10 days, "Where is the objective airborne corps?"

The future tactical rotocraft moved FCS-equipped units, effectively achieving an air-mechanized capability. While not prolific across the Army, this capability enabled the commander to transcend terrain limitations and project combined arms forces to the decisive point on the battlefield in the enemy's front, flanks and rear to attack the enemy's tactical and operational centers of gravity. Another FCS unit exploiting the future tactical rotocraft could attack the same position in a different location, keeping the enemy off balance simultaneously. Van Riper observed, "Equipped with the FCS and FTR to transport them, the objective forces were able to combine the firepower of the heavy mechanized forces with the speed of light air assault forces."[5]

Revolutionary split-based, pulse logistics supported the corps' fighting power by bringing forward only the logistics needed to enhance maneuver. FTR and enhanced intratheater airlift capabilities made this possible and feasible and enabled the commander to keep the most combat power engaged while his force was incrementally resupplied with a small combat service support battlefield footprint.

The situation presented opportunities for simultaneous attacks from the front, flanks and rear. Task Force (TF) *Euphrates*—composed of the II Turkish Corps, the XVIII Corps' dominant objective-maneuver divisions and the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps—now poised to close on its main objective in a linear advance. Composed of the 101st and 82d Airborne Divisions, TF *Checkmate* was poised to exploit the aerial dimension to cut off the western NIR army from opening an escape corridor into eastern NIR territory.[6] Thus, TF *Checkmate* would be the hammer to the anvil of TF *Euphrates* with the Republican Guard Corps in the middle.

The Objective Force proved to be a key operational enabler, allowing the commander to employ agile, dominant land forces throughout the theater.[7] Key enablers for this operational method on the nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield of the future were:

- Emerging concepts and capabilities for force projection and sustainment enabling new levels of strategic responsiveness.
- Dominating the full spectrum through greater responsiveness, deployability, agility, versatility, lethality, survivability and sustainability.
- Early and continuously integrating fires and maneuver at strategic and operational levels.
- Employing dominant land forces throughout the theater's depth using the Objective Force.
- Fully integrating multinational and interagency capabilities.
- Increasing situational understanding and knowledge by fully integrating C4ISR into operations.

Future Research

The war game also exposed many areas requiring further study and research, including:

- Deployment and sustainment enablers.
- Balance in deployment speed and theater opening capabilities.
- Diversity of operational demands and force design.
- Deployability and employability enhancements.
- Balance of joint interdependence and organic capabilities.
- Institutional training and leader development for the Objective Force.

Key areas for institutional study and research include:

- Strategies to maintain Army core competencies while expanding training tempo and breadth of tasks associated with increases in interdependence of joint forces, coalitions and interagency teams.
- Evolution of existing paradigms for institutional soldier and leader development to fully exploit Objective Force capabilities.

The ATWG is an important step in the broader effort to transform the Army into a more strategically responsive and full-spectrum 21st-century force. The war game provides a thoughtful description of the potential strategic and operational demands the Army faces as part of the joint team and highlights a number of issues for further study.

Continuing to use the war game will examine the Objective Force's operational qualities and provide for further development. Also, the war game's granularity will improve and move from describing strategic and operational demands to refining, then evaluating, those demands.

As the war game evolves, the strength of the effort remains the quality and experience of the participants. The strategic and operational savvy of seasoned national security experts and warfighters from across the armed services, interagency teams and allies focuses the Army's vision through insights and analyses. These collective efforts will help ensure that the Army remains the world's most respected and feared ground force. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Reachback is the ability to exploit nonorganic capabilities located within and outside the theater to expand force capabilities and its applicability across the spectrum of conflict while reducing the in-theater footprint. For example, B-42s flew round-trip from the Continental US during Operation *Desert Storm* in support of ground forces that were bombing Iraqi positions.
2. US Department of the Army, Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, "Army Transformation War Game Report: Operational Insights" (May 2000).
3. LTC William Hix, "Army Transformation War Game Insights: Setting the Conditions for Global Engagement V," unpublished briefing, date and location not given.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Vertical envelopment is operational and tactical maneuver in which troops—either air-dropped or air-landed—launch attacks into a force's rear and flanks from an unexpected direction or position of advantage.
7. "Army Transformation War Game Report."

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Building a Future: World War II Quartermaster Corps

by Marcia L. Lightbody

Valuable innovations in the integration, coordination and attitude of service to the soldier were developed just before and during World War II by the Quartermaster Corps Military Planning Division under Brigadier General Georges F. Doriot. The division's task was to prepare soldiers for war in all possible climates. However, the only inventory on hand was leftover World War I clothing and equipment.

At a symposium in 1941, Doriot described the status of the Army's equipment: "Many items, which had been developed as the result of field experience in the mud and rain of northern France in 1917 and 1918, were modified in peacetime to be more suitable for the garrison life at Fort Benning, Georgia, or Fort Sam Houston, Texas. Even after the outbreak of the war, [many did not recognize] the importance of immediately improving existing equipment."[1]

Creative Planning

In 1942 Captain Russell Davis, Doriot's executive officer, stared in amazement at a tank parked in his Washington, DC, office parking lot. Only Doriot could have had a tank delivered to the parking lot. Davis recalls Doriot's words: "We have been asked to develop clothing for men who are going to be fighting in a tank. [I]f we are going to do it, we are going to have to have a tank."[2]

In planning, Doriot had an astounding grasp of detail and a passion for soldiers' well-being that pervaded his speeches and correspondence.[3] His far-reaching thoughts encompassed human engineering before ergonomics had a name.[4] Before 1942 it was unheard of to measure the width of foot space in a tank to see how much area a man's shoes might use or the size of hand controls to understand what gloves he could wear.

In 1929 Quartermaster General Lieutenant General Edmund Gregory had attended one of Doriot's Harvard Business School courses. In 1941 Gregory persuaded Doriot to come into the Army. Gregory knew that Doriot's unusual personality traits included an abiding interest in the country's welfare and a pioneer's zeal in exercise physiology.

Roadblocks to Planning

Roadblocks to early military planning efforts were major. Robert Bates, who entered the Quartermaster Corps in early 1941 as an expert in cold weather and mountaineering, reported three impediments:

- By regulation, new equipment could not be provided until old equipment was used.
- No item could be procured in quantity until the theater commander had approved it—and overseas commanders would not approve what they had not seen.
- If a new item was designed, the designer faced an extreme shortage of critical materials; metals and rubber were reserved for higher-priority planes, weapons and vehicles.[5]

Between World War I and World War II, under the National Defense Act of 1920, military planning was based on a defensive concept that visualized military operations occurring mainly near or within the borders of the Continental United States or in similar climatic areas. Because the large stocks of surplus World War I clothing had to be issued until exhausted, little pressure existed before 1941 to manufacture new items.

Therefore, it was not surprising that in early 1942 the Military Planning Division faced a series of materiel disasters. Tents fell apart in the Southwest Pacific after two or three weeks because the fire-resistant finish had no fungicide to protect it against mildew. Troops in Alaska, preparing for a possible Japanese invasion, were largely immobilized by trench foot caused by ill-fitting and inadequately constructed footwear. An entire load of food had to be dumped into the ocean because the cans had rusted.[6]

Compounding the problem was some military leaders' viewpoints that rations were already the best in existence. Early in the war a high-ranking general told Doriot that all soldiers needed in the way of supplies were coffee, beans and blankets. He ordered Doriot not to spend any money on food research or on clothing.[7] It was not until after Bataan had fallen and a statement was made at a high-level meeting that the troops could have held out longer if the food had been of superior quality that ration development was transferred to the Military Planning Division.

Organizing Planning

The Military Planning Division's efforts had two thrusts—to acquire the division's own experts and research information in a hurry and to establish a quartermaster advisory board that would include civil and military leaders. Doriot recruited staff for the division by culling War Department lists of new recruits who had attended courses at the business school. He sought experts in every field. For example, by recruiting leaders in US mountaineering and arctic exploration, he acquired expertise in equipment and clothing for outdoor survival, cold-weather travel and Arctic climatology.

His questions to those who joined the division were "what ifs" of every environmental possibility. The queries

came in terms of combat. For example, what would happen if the United States had to support the Russians pushed by Germany into the Urals? The mountaineers found themselves conducting studies that included arctic and Asiatic port conditions, sea ice, temperatures and precipitation.[8]

Other experts arrived who were authorities on jungle conditions, packaging, leather, mechanical engineering, textiles and clothing, plastics, stress physiology and Near East geology. Doriot's questions to all were "what if" or "can we." The first body armor was developed because Doriot asked, "Can we develop a bullet-proof vest?"[9]

The Military Planning Division was based on close coordination between those doing technical planning and development and those crafting operational plans and requirements for end items. The effect was that experts made immediate decisions. An item request did not go to procurement unless it was accompanied by a list of approved people to produce it, a statement of funds availability and War Production Board approval.[10]

After Doriot set up the advisory board, he made sure that members monitored the work at their own plants or institutions. He also listened to them. For example, he could ask Walter Chrysler for help with an automotive problem, and a pressing concern would get high-level attention. Industry leaders, under the stimulus of war, were eager to contribute expertise and facilities to solving design and materiel problems. The many offers of assistance required expert evaluation, coordination and facilities. In time, the causes of deteriorating textiles in the tropics would be understood because of an intense in-house division laboratory effort.[11]

A number of university laboratories also contributed to the development program. The Harvard Fatigue Laboratory researched clothing principles, the efficiency of proposed items and nutrition and exercise.[12] The University of Indiana Department of Physiology conducted laboratory testing of clothing for hot climates. The Tanners' Council laboratory at the University of Cincinnati analyzed leather problems.

The Military Planning Division's Requirements Branch was a small group of talented mathematicians who worked up the numerical requirements to clothe, feed and equip an 8-million-man army. The mathematicians worked under intense pressure, using manual adding machines. Often they were told at the last minute that war strategy had changed, and their work had to be scrapped or repeated.

Innovations and Savings

By developing substitutes, particularly new uses for plastics, the Military Planning Division achieved extraordinary savings in critical raw materials. For example, redesigning button shanks on overcoats to use plastic rather than tin saved 90 tons of tin. During 1942 using plastic in some shoes saved 4,000 tons of rubber. By mid-1942 using substitutes and eliminating metal where possible, the savings for chrome, nickel, stainless steel and aluminum was in the hundreds and thousands of tons.[14] Changing specifications because of shortages was not easy, but key factors in success were engineers, industrial specialists, field tests and laboratory opinions.[15]

Short-term and prolonged equipment tests were highly creative. Tests conducted at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory before the war were the basis for new tests that would determine the various supply product's feasibility and suitability. In the winter of 1941-1942, subjects with attached heat sensors tested sleeping bag designs. The tests revealed the kind of comparative information that quantitative records on skin temperatures could provide, which led the Army to set up its own climatic-test chamber.[16]

When the war began, the services competed intensely for the limited supply of raw wool to use to insulate clothing. Two members of the Military Planning Division ran an informal test at the US Department of Agriculture's (USDA's) cold research center in Maryland. Fourteen subjects wore standard Army coats identical except for the linings. A specialist from the Bureau of Standards controlled the thermocouples and the readings for each garment.[17] The researchers learned that regardless of what material was used, a garment's insulation was related to its thickness, as long as its exterior was windproof. Later experience showed the informal test results were also correct for still air.[18]

By February 1942 the cold weather group had from 30 to 40 items nearly ready for testing, but there was still no realistic test facility. The group initiated the Alaskan Test Expedition and spent over a month testing clothing and equipment in moderate to extreme cold on the slopes of Mount McKinley. Each member of the group wrote an evaluation of the items and changes were incorporated into finished products.[19]

The Division also pushed the development of dehydrated foods and achieved savings in packaging, shipping bulk and pack space. The effort to improve rations was continuous, and the use of dehydrated foods eliminated weight from the soldier's pack. Chancellor of the University of California at Davis Emil M. Mrak later remarked, "Natick and its predecessor in Chicago have done more for the advancement of food science than any other agency."[20] The cooperation of the Division and the USDA in revolutionizing special Army food and packaging was heartening to government observers.[21]

In the early part of the war the Division became interested in more effective approaches to the problems of flavor and food acceptance. The studies were a beginning effort to understand a broad range of practical problems in acceptance.[22]

The idea of using field observers to study soldiers' use of new equipment began early in the war. These efforts became the first Army marketing surveys. Observers traveled into combat areas then reported to the Military Planning Division on quantities of products needed and any redesign or attention required. The independent observers' reports were critical to getting changes incorporated and problems fixed early in product use.

Selling Soldiers' Needs

Doriot was relentless in pursuing what can only be called a full-time campaign of selling soldiers' needs within the Armed Forces and industry. He later remarked, "We were able to foresee many needs before we were told about them."[23]

Doriot had two allies who played critical roles from the start—Gregory and Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall. Doriot later commended the depth of Marshall's concern for the soldier and his helpfulness in cutting procurement delays. At their first meeting Marshall informed Doriot, who had brought a bag of sample shoes, that "your shoes only last 13 days in combat. . . . Do you have anything to say?" Doriot replied, "Oh, yes, sir, a great deal. [F]or four or five months we have been trying to get staff approval for this combat boot and [we] can't get it. We know that our present shoes are not good for combat; the shoe leather isn't good; I'm surprised they even get to the combat zone." Marshall asked, "What do you want?" Doriot replied, "I want approval for that combat boot. Industry does not want to make it but we must have it. The ASF [Army Service Forces] Headquarters is completely opposed to it." Marshall thoughtfully said, "[T]his is a citizens' Army; I want them well taken care of; I want to save their lives and if you have to spoil them, do it and from now on any time you have trouble you come to me. What do you wish from me today?"[24] Doriot asked for 300,000 pair of shoes for a production test.

As to quality control, which was at first a major problem, the Division was able eventually to devise quality control statistical techniques for production line sampling that reduced manufacturing errors from 25 to 5 percent.[25] The integration of all components of the soldiers' clothing, equipment and rations into a unified whole was a goal expressed in 1943. Doriot conceptualized the design of the soldiers' items of clothing "in relation to each other," not as a large number of unrelated items.[26] Today's soldier system is its counterpart.

The effort to promote the soldiers' needs was successful in creating appreciation for new items of clothing, equipment and food among the military and for continually upgrading existing items. At Marshall's request, general officers received orientation to the Division before assuming a field command.[27] Doriot's interest was in the well being of all military personnel, not the Army alone, and he gave the same concern to everyone.

Cooperation and Client Service

Speaking in retrospect, Doriot remarked the cooperation that eventually came to the Military Planning Division: "We had the cooperation, friendship and the respect of Army and other commanders. We also had the cooperation of many people in industry, in science, the War Production Board and in the Congress. We had letters from generals . . . and others thanking us for our liaison men and observers, both on R&D [research and development] and requirements. These gentlemen and the men under their command were our clients and that was our attitude toward them."[28] How Doriot got things done within the division was an extension of this viewpoint. "You cannot order people to do things," he told a Division member, "you have to sell them on the idea and let them go as far as they can."[29]

During the war, Doriot wrote to a Division field observer in a combat zone, "I have read with very much interest all your letters. I am particularly happy that whenever you have the opportunity you pay attention to the Air forces, the Marines and the Navy. Indeed we must help everyone any time in any way. Be quite certain to tell me anything you might need and keep on advising us as to suggestions we should follow. . . . Do not hesitate to let me know whatever you want that we do not do fast enough or do not do right."[30]

At war's end, the Division's contribution in superior food, clothing and equipment was a significant factor in the lower number of US casualties in comparison to fatalities suffered by other nations. The QM Corps is truly one of the great success stories. The Military Planning Division's methods early in World War II in integration, coordination and an attitude of service are particularly relevant today.

Update

In 1954 the Natick Laboratories was dedicated to the achievement of Doriot's vision of an "Institute of Man" to continue to build on his interdisciplinary wartime research. The Army values demonstrated in World War II efforts continued. In the words of Mary Mandels, a pioneer and long-time researcher, "We did not have jobs—we had a calling."[31]

In 1967 the Army recognized Doriot's contribution as founder of the organization at Natick. The ceremonies acknowledged the 25 years of unprecedented mutual cooperation for the combat soldier between the national scientific and industrial communities and Army enterprise.[32] ***MR***

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The Fog of War: The Vietnamese View of the Ia Drang Battle ©

by Merle L. Pribbenow

For the past 35 years the US Army and the North Vietnamese have claimed victory in the October to November 1965 Ia Drang Valley Battle. While the United States' side of the battle has been extensively documented, the Vietnamese version has remained obscure.

Although heavily colored by communist hagiography and propaganda, recently published People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) accounts provide answers to many questions and acknowledge a number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) mistakes and command failures. When added to information from US sources, these accounts reveal how greatly the fog of war, overoptimism and blind fate influenced the battle.

The B3 Front Plan

According to PAVN, the Ia Drang Battle grew out of the B3 (Central Highlands) Front's plan to lure US and South Vietnamese forces into battle on terms favorable to the communists. The plan included besieging the remote Plei Me border outpost south of Pleiku in South Vietnam's Central Highlands and forcing US and South Vietnamese forces to come to the rescue. The goal was to annihilate five or six US companies.[1]

The NVA 320th and 33d Regiments were to launch the campaign, but one of the NVA's finest units—the 304th Division—would reinforce the B3 Front. In August 1965 the 304th received orders to move south to the Central Highlands. The 304th's lead element, the 66th Regiment, was scheduled to arrive in time for the campaign's final phase.[2]

Aware they could not match newly arrived US forces' power, NVA commanders knew their strategy was risky. During political indoctrination sessions before the campaign began, 320th Regiment troops expressed serious doubts.[3]

Stunning Blows

The troops had reason to be skeptical. The 33d Regiment, launching the Plei Me siege on 19 October 1965, was stunned by unexpectedly powerful US air strikes that inflicted heavy losses and totally disrupted communications between regimental headquarters and forward units. After the battle, B3 Front headquarters admitted that this loss of communications with front-line units severely hampered its ability to make timely and informed command decisions during this phase of the battle.[4]

The 320th Regiment's ambush of a large South Vietnamese relief column on 23 October also resulted in heavy NVA casualties.[5] On 26 October, two days after the 1st Brigade, 1st US Cavalry Division, arrived in Pleiku, the B3 Front commander decided that discretion was the better part of valor and ordered troops back to the Ia Drang base area.[6]

From 24 October to 9 November, 1st Brigade, 1st US Cavalry Division, heliborne airmobile elements fought a series of engagements against retreating communist troops in the Ia Drang Valley. The 33d Regiment bore the brunt of the US attacks. The regimental hospital was overrun on 1 November. On 4 November, US 2d Squadron, 12th US Cavalry Regiment forces engaged two 33d Regiment, 3d Battalion companies in a stiff battle. On 6 November, two 2d Squadron, 8th US Cavalry Regiment companies estimated several hundred NVA 1st and 2d Battalion, 33d Regiment forces killed. Twenty-six US soldiers were killed; 53 were wounded.[7]

The B3 Front viewed the 4 and 6 October engagements as victories and claimed that from 29 October to 9 November five US platoons had been annihilated and that 385 US troops were killed or wounded.[8] Actual 1st Brigade losses were 59 men killed and 196 wounded.[9] The NVA 33d Regiment suffered catastrophic losses, being reduced to less than half its authorized strength.[10]

Postbattle NVA analyses conclude that US helicopter leap-frog attacks into the heart of the base area had thrown the NVA back onto the defensive, disrupted command and control, and prevented the NVA from concentrating forces.[11] The US 1st Brigade withdrew, setting the stage for the arrival of the two principal participants in the Ia Drang Battle—the 1st US Cavalry Division's 3d Brigade and the NVA's 66th Regiment.

The Battle Heats Up

The NVA attacked on 12 November. Twenty-six NVA sappers, armed with four mortars and guided by local guerrillas, raided the new 3d Brigade Headquarters at the Catecka Tea Plantation, killing seven US soldiers and wounding 23.[12] Earlier, on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the 66th Regiment had dropped its heavy equipment, lightened its packs and proceeded by forced march to the battlefield.[13] The 66th crossed into South Vietnam on 1 November and headed for assembly areas. During the approach the regiment suffered its first losses. On 3 November, the 8th Battalion was ambushed by a US reconnaissance patrol, provoking a vicious night engagement that led

the 8th Battalion to believe it had annihilated a US platoon.[14]

On 10 November, the 66th Regiment arrived at the Chu Pong Massif on the southwestern side of the Ia Drang Valley near the Cambodian border. The Chu Pong, a massive terrain feature, housed B3 Front Headquarters, its support units and supply warehouses. The regimental headquarters and the 7th Battalion occupied adjacent bivouac areas on the mountain's southeastern face. Five kilometers away, the 9th Battalion occupied the eastern face. The 8th Battalion established a base in the Ia Drang Valley itself, perhaps eight miles away. Although tired and hungry from the long forced march, the troops began building huts, digging fortifications and transporting rice and ammunition from the B3 Front's supply caches.[15]

While the 66th Regiment's battalions were at almost full strength—500 men with from 120 to 125 men per company—and well-equipped with AK-47 and SKS rifles, light and medium machineguns, RPGs, 82-millimeter mortars and recoilless rifles, Central Highlands jungles were foreign to them. Most of the men were as unfamiliar with the terrain as US troops were.

The 1st Battalion, 7th US Cavalry, arrived at landing zone (LZ) X-Ray, a clearing less than one kilometer below the 9th Battalion's positions. This fact played a significant role in the coming battle.[16]

NVA histories reveal that contrary to claims that the NVA lured US troops into a trap, the NVA were completely surprised by US troops' 14 November landing at LZ X-Ray. When the first US helicopters arrived, 66th Regiment and 9th Battalion commanders were surveying the terrain several kilometers away on the banks of the Ia Drang River. The 66th Regiment Political Officer Ngoc Chau and the 9th Battalion's deputy political officer were also away from their offices.[17]

From his new headquarters atop the Chu Pong, B3 Front Forward Commander Nguyen Huu An watched in dismay as US air strikes and artillery blasted the 9th Battalion area and as waves of US helicopters swooped out of sight behind the mountain.[18] Once on the ground, 7th US Cavalry troops advanced straight up the slopes of the Chu Pong toward 9th Battalion positions.

Under heavy bombardment, unable to see what was happening because of the thick jungle vegetation and with its forward outposts eliminated in the initial US attack, the 9th Battalion did not detect approaching US troops until they were only 100 meters away. US troops advanced in two columns, one headed for 9th Battalion's 11th Company; the other headed for the 9th Battalion Headquarters area. Just as the shooting began, the 9th Battalion almost collapsed.

Acting on his own, the 11th Company commander launched a fierce counterattack against US troops, but the 9th Battalion political officer, who in the absence of the military commander was in charge of the battalion, panicked. He bolted from the command post, leaving the battalion leaderless.[19]

A lesser unit might have broken and run, but 9th Battalion troops were among the NVA's best. A first lieutenant, the senior officer left in the command post, immediately took charge. Calling for help from the unengaged 13th Company, he ordered all headquarters personnel—cooks, runners and medics—to grab weapons and fight. One by one, the battalion's four companies joined the battle as work details returned and commanders pieced together what was happening.

The 9th Battalion commander, racing back from the banks of the Ia Drang, reached the 11th Company an hour later but never returned to his command post, and he never reestablished contact with all of his units.

At 1700, US troops finally withdrew. The 9th Battalion's units also began retreating, scattering in all directions. The 66th Regiment commander bypassed the 9th Battalion to return directly to his regimental command post, got lost and did not find his way back to his headquarters for two days.

Some isolated troops, not realizing their units had left, remained behind and continued to engage US forces in scattered fire fights until late that night. The 9th Battalion reported destroying one US company and crippling another.[20] After the battle, the 9th Battalion commander was severely criticized for failing to regain control of his battalion and allowing it to disintegrate.[21]

Meanwhile, B3 Front Forward Headquarters and the 66th Regiment were trying to control the battle. Learning that the commanders were not at their command posts, Deputy Regimental Commander Pham Cong Cuu, who was at 7th Battalion Headquarters when the attack occurred, alerted the battalion to prepare to move out.

Taking a group of 7th Battalion officers with him, Cuu went forward to assess the situation. He arrived in the 9th Battalion area in the early afternoon and found it in a state of confusion, with many wounded moving to the rear and no one sure what was going on. The wounded deputy battalion political officer could tell him only that the enemy troops were all US forces (no South Vietnamese) and that they were aggressive and well-armed.[22]

Chau, arriving in the area later, encountered the 9th Battalion's retreating 13th Company and directed it to leave one platoon behind to maintain contact with US forces. During the 66th Regiment commander's absence, Chau assumed command.[23]

Late in the afternoon, B3 Forward Headquarters ordered Chau to attack the US position with available forces. Chau sent 7th Battalion troops forward to join the scattered 9th Battalion elements. He placed Cuu in direct command of the assault.[24]

The attack was originally scheduled to begin at 0300 on 15 November, but because of the unfamiliar terrain and continuing US artillery bombardment, it was almost daylight before troops were in position. Two 7th Battalion companies and 9th Battalion elements prepared to assault one side of the US perimeter while the 7th Battalion's weapons company deployed on the other side as a blocking force. This would also allow them to provide machinegun grazing fire across the position.[25]

At this point it becomes difficult to reconcile NVA accounts with what

actually happened. The accounts say 7th Battalion assault companies overran the US position and briefly swept the area before withdrawing at 0645 under heavy US air attack. Surviving US troops were said to have fled into the jungle.

Cuu claims he reported by radio to B3 Front Headquarters that his men had overrun the US position, captured more than 70 weapons and that he had 150 effectives left in his force, which indicated losses of from 300 to 400 men. Cuu admits B3 Front was at first incredulous about his report, asking if Cuu had personally checked the report or if he was just relaying reports from subordinate elements.[26] In fact, a section of the 1st Battalion, 7th US Cavalry's perimeter had been briefly overrun, but the penetration was quickly repaired and the US position held. Forty-two US soldiers were killed and 20 were wounded.[27]

After what was thought to be a victory, the NVA attack force withdrew, leaving only one platoon behind to maintain contact with the US force. According to NVA accounts, the 66th Regiment's commanders were unaware of a new US battalion's arrival on foot—the 2/5 Cavalry—and the "lost platoon's" rescue. They knew only of the incessant US bombing and shelling their stay-behind element endured and of the helicopters arriving at LZ X-Ray to evacuate bodies and bring in reinforcements.[28]

The Second Attack

B3 Forward Headquarters ordered a second attack on LZ X-Ray and ordered the 33d Regiment to attack two nearby US artillery fire bases to support the LZ X-Ray attack—a mission the 33d Regiment could not carry out.[29] With most of 7th Battalion destroyed, the 66th Regiment was forced to use the 7th Regiment's unblooded 3d Company and one platoon of 1st Company as the main assault elements, supported by the 7th Battalion's heavy weapons.

At 2000 on 15 November, NVA troops reached the assembly area and went forward to attack positions. However, the stay-behind force had not noticed that US defenders had pulled their lines back 50 meters in the perimeter section that was the second assault's primary target. This move, with the constant artillery bombardment, confused the attackers.[30]

Not until 0300 on 16 November did NVA troops get close enough to US lines to launch an assault. Although they claim to have inflicted numerous casualties before being driven back, NVA historians acknowledge that the assault was largely unsuccessful.[31] While US forces actually suffered only six wounded; the NVA sustained significant losses.[32]

According to the Vietnamese, 7th Battalion, 66th Regiment elements returned to the area the night of 16 November to collect the dead and wounded but were detected and fired on, causing panicky US troops to fire wildly around the entire perimeter.[33] This probably refers to an incident at first light on 16 November when US defenders at LZ X-Ray, firing a Mad Minute to preempt a dawn attack, flushed out a large group of NVA hiding close to the perimeter.[34] Vietnamese accounts admit that after this attack the 7th and 9th Battalions were *hors de combat*—the 7th because of its horrendous losses and the 9th because its units were still scattered and disorganized after the haphazard retreat on 14 November.[35]

Misperceptions engendered by the fog of war and the exaggerated victory claims that two NVA battalions made began a tragic chain of events. Although actual US losses were 79 killed and 121 wounded, NVA commanders believed the original US battalion at LZ X-Ray, the 7th US Cavalry, had been crippled.[36] Blinded by US airstrikes and artillery, NVA commanders did not know that LZ X-Ray had been heavily reinforced, that the cavalry was being evacuated or that LZ X-Ray was to be abandoned the next day. Ignorant of these facts, An ordered the 66th Regiment's 8th Battalion—still fresh and waiting in the Ia Drang Valley—to move south to finish off what he believed to be a crippled US battalion.[37]

The 8th Battalion commander, Le Xuan Phoi, headed his men out on the evening of 16 November, but when US air and artillery strikes blocked his route, he was forced to stop and reorganize. At dawn the battalion moved out again, heading south in battle formation with the 8th Company acting as an advance guard some distance ahead of the main formation. The battalion's main body followed: the battalion headquarters, two infantry companies, a weapons company and the regimental 12.7-millimeter heavy machinegun company, attached to the battalion for this operation.[38]

For US troops left at LZ X-Ray, the night of 16-17 November passed quietly. The next morning the squadrons left LZ X-Ray on foot, heading north toward the artillery fire base at LZ Columbus about three miles away. While the 2/5th Cavalry proceeded directly to LZ Columbus, the 2/7th Cavalry—10 to 15 minutes behind—turned off about three kilometers out and headed for a clearing designated LZ Albany.

Having seen the hundreds of NVA bodies rotting in the sun around the perimeter and after the quiet night at LZ X-Ray, the troops assumed the NVA was finished. Nearly 2,000 NVA soldiers, almost an entire regiment, had been reported killed. After adding the number wounded, there should have been nothing left of the two NVA regiments.[39] The march to LZ Albany would be just a "walk in the sun."[40]

Shortly before noon, the 2/7th Cavalry point element tripped over several hidden NVA soldiers who belonged to one of the five-man ambush teams from the 33d Regiment that had been assigned to cover potential helicopter landing zones. US troops captured two soldiers, but three escaped. The US column halted to interrogate the prisoners.[41] Meanwhile, the NVA 8th Battalion's main body, 1 kilometer behind its lead company, encountered NVA 1st Company, 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment elements. The escaped NVA soldiers reported that two US platoons were just ahead and moving in their direction. Phoi immediately sent a runner to recall his point company and began deploying for battle.

Poor visibility caused by thick vegetation and terrain hampered the NVA and US troops. Unaware he

was facing a full US squadron and with little time, Phoi deployed from march formation. He put only the lead company on line, backed by the weapons company. He held the other units in reserve.[42]

The US column again moved forward. Phoi waited until US soldiers were yards away before opening fire. The two lead US platoons were shattered. Behind them more US troops advanced, firing as they came. Only then did Phoi realize that the two platoons were not alone. He moved another infantry company up immediately behind the first, then attacked.[43]

After receiving the battalion's recall order and hearing the sounds of gunfire, 8th Company, on point, sped back toward the battle. The company's lead platoon got lost and never made it into the fight. The other company ran straight into the US column's rear and immediately attacked. Phoi now committed 7th Company, shifting it into a line alongside 6th Company. Meanwhile, two companies of the nearby 33d Regiment, led by Cuu, also entered the fray.[44]

The NVA 8th Battalion was quickly decapitated. The commander died before the battle ended, and the political officer died within the first hour. Almost all company- and platoon-level officers lay dead or wounded. At an 8th Battalion squad leader's request—an indication of how many 8th Battalion officers were down—the 1st Battalion, 33d Regiment, deputy commander assumed command of both battalions. Within hours he, too, was dead.[45]

Leaving the bulk of the 2/7 US Cavalry trapped between and hopelessly intermingled with NVA forces hidden in the tall jungle grass, US forces at either end of the column regrouped into two separate perimeters. Virtually leaderless and under heavy US air and artillery attack, the surviving NVA troops, their hatred of Americans fueled by communist tales of US atrocities in South Vietnam and party exhortations to become "Heroic killers of Americans," mindlessly slaughtered US wounded.[46]

Vietnamese accounts of the battle give contorted explanations of why so many US soldiers were shot in the head or in the back.[47] A postwar review reveals that NVA commanders knew what really happened. During the battle there were "mistakes" in implementing the NVA policy on taking prisoners of war.[48] The NVA took no prisoners.

The next day, US forces counted 403 NVA bodies and hundreds of weapons left on the battlefield. In this instance, however, the NVA claim to have annihilated a US battalion was not entirely without foundation. The 2/7th US Cavalry and attached units suffered 155 killed and 121 wounded.[49] The encounter, which Vietnamese histories admit was completely accidental, was one of the war's bloodiest battles.[50]

On 18 November, the US artillery fire base at LZ Columbus was hit by an attack that was easily repelled. Three US soldiers were killed and 13 wounded in exchange for at least 27 dead NVA.[51] This unsuccessful attack was the 33d Regiment's belated effort to carry out the order it had been given three days before.

The regimental chief of staff commanded the attack. Because of poor reconnaissance, one battalion's assault troops missed the perimeter entirely, hitting only thin air. Admitting serious morale problems, PAVN officers faulted the attack for inadequate coordination and the troops for not pressing the assault with sufficient resolution.[52]

The campaign's final battle was anticlimactic. On 20 November, South Vietnamese airborne forces, supported by US artillery, encountered the 320th Regiment's 635th and 334th Battalions along the Cambodian border. The 635th's commander, whose unit had suffered heavy losses during the South Vietnamese relief column ambush in October, refused to engage the enemy and retreated without authorization, leaving the sister battalion alone on the battlefield.

The two units lost hundreds of men and weapons, and it was several days before the 320th Regiment managed to reestablish contact with the 635th Battalion. A PAVN analysis admits the regiment "did not accomplish its assigned mission."[53]

The Aftermath

An NVA review of the campaign found that in their first major battle with US forces, NVA commanders had seriously underestimated their opponent. Specifically, the NVA had been surprised by the 1st US Cavalry Division's armed helicopters' firepower; the use of B-52s to tactically support ground troops; the power of the 1st Cavalry's field artillery, which the NVA had believed would be unable to deploy and operate effectively in this roadless, jungle-covered region; and the incredible mobility of 1st Cavalry troopers who, even when their forces were caught at an initial disadvantage, used helicopters to concentrate rapidly and decisively to shift the balance of forces and turn the tide of battle.[54]

The North Vietnamese were also disturbed by leadership problems that surfaced during this campaign. All three regimental commanders were censured for their conduct during the campaign. The 66th Regiment commander received a severe reprimand for failing to command his unit during the LZ X-Ray battle. The 33d Regiment Commander was criticized for failing to maintain contact with his troops during the siege at Plei Me, for not personally commanding the attack on LZ Columbus and for delegating all decision-making responsibility to subordinates. The 320th Regiment commander was cited for failing to personally conduct reconnaissance of the terrain before ambushing the South Vietnamese relief column and for clumsily handling his unit throughout the campaign.[55]

A 1966 Central Highlands Front report claimed that in five major engagements with US forces between 14 and 18 November 1965, NVA forces killed 559 soldiers and wounded 669.[56] PAVN histories claim the United States suffered 1,500 to 1,700 casualties during the Ia Drang Campaign.[57] The US military estimates that 3,561 NVA were killed and more than 1,000 were wounded during engagements with the 1st Cavalry. The US Army estimated 305 killed and 524 wounded for the 35-day campaign.[58] Neither side believes the other's figures.

The US military viewed the battle as proof that its helicopter-assault tactics and strategy of attrition could win the war. The NVA saw in the heavy US casualties inflicted at LZ X-Ray and LZ Albany vindication for its belief that communist troops could also inflict sufficient pain on US forces. Clearly, each side saw only the results it wanted to see, and each thought it had hurt the other more than it had.

Later in the war, as firepower and attrition continued to take their toll, the NVA realized it suffered from a problem common to all—the need for truthful reporting and a willingness to hear the truth. "Based on our experiences . . . we can see that reporting from subordinate commanders to their superiors did not accurately reflect the real situation. Successes were usually exaggerated and mistakes and failures were not reported. This had a not insignificant impact on our operations. It caused senior commanders to misjudge and misevaluate the situation, which in turn led them to make incorrect policy decisions and to set goals and objectives which were unattainable. . . . Commanders must listen to the opinions of subordinates. . . . They must not be afraid to hear negatives, they must not be willing to listen only to those things which are positive, and they must never accuse a subordinate of harboring harmful thoughts and opinions when the subordinate is only telling the truth. . . . Commanders . . . must not be afraid to discuss mistakes and failures. Time after time, after every victory we won, so often that it seemed to be the rule rather than the exception, we fell into the traps of subjectivism, over-eagerness and over-simplification."[59] ***MR***

NOTES

1. LG Hoang, Phuong: "Several Lessons on Campaign Planning and Command Implementation During the Plei Me Campaign," *The Plei Me Victory: Looking Back after 30 Years*, Military History Institute and 3rd Corps [hereafter cited as *The Plei Me Victory*] (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1995), 37-38; Nguyen Huy Toan and Pham Quang Dinh, The 304th Division, vol II, Editorial Direction: 304th Division Headquarters and Party Committee, (Hanoi, People's Army Publishing House, 1990), 21.
2. Toan and Dinh, 19-20.
3. Mai Hong Linh, "A Number of Issues Relating to Party and Political Activities During the Plei Me Campaign-1965," *The Plei Me Victory*, 110.
4. Military History Institute and 3rd Corps, *The Plei Me Offensive Campaign-1965* [hereafter cited as *The Plei Me Offensive*] (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1993), 33.
5. Ibid., 35.
6. Phuong, 40; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 37.
7. J.D. Coleman, Pleiku: *The Dawn of Helicopter Warfare in Vietnam*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), 168-84; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 39-40.
8. Phuong, *The Plei Me Victory*, 40.
9. Coleman, 189.
10. Hal Moore and Joseph Galloway, *We Were Soldiers Once . . . And Young* (New York: Harper-Collins, 1993), 57; Coleman, 185.
11. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 41; Pham Vinh Phuc, "Special Characteristics of U.S. Helicopter Assault Landing Tactics During the Plei Me Campaign," *The Plei Me Victory*, 122.
12. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 44; Moore and Galloway, 39.
13. Toan and Dinh, 26-27.
14. Actual US losses were 4 killed and 25 wounded. US forces reported killing almost 100 NVA; Coleman, 163; Moore and Galloway, 33; Le Nhu Huan quoting Pham Cong Cuu, "The 66th Regiment Annihilates the US 2nd Cavalry Battalion in the Ia Drang Valley," *The Plei Me Victory*, 98; Phuong, 41.
15. Now, PAVN historians admit the Ho Chi Minh Trail was not the main source of supplies for this campaign; weapons and ammunition were shipped in from Sihanoukville, and food and supplies were purchased in Cambodia; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 27.
16. Toan and Dinh, 29; Huan quoting Cuu, 96-98.
17. Nguyen Quoc Dung, *The Plei Me Victory*, 129. This article contains the 1 January 1966 B3 Front "Report on Five Battles Against US Forces," 14-18 November 1965; Toan and Dinh, 29; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 45.
18. CG Nguyen Huu An and Nguyen Tu Duong, *New Battlefields: A Memoir* (Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House, 1995), 36.
19. Toan and Dinh, 29-30; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 45.
20. Ibid.
21. MG Tran Ngoc Son, "A Few Thoughts on the Lessons of the Plei Me Campaign," *The Plei Me Victory*, 205; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 46.
22. Huan quoting Cuu, 98-99.
23. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 47; Toan and Dinh, 31.
24. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 47-48; An and Duong, 37-38.
25. Huan quoting Cuu, 99-101. The 7th Battalion's 3d Company, away on a work detail, did not participate in this attack; Toan and Dinh, 31-32; Moore and Galloway, 171, say the Viet Cong H-15 Battalion participated in this attack. Coleman, 274, says the H-15 Battalion made the later attack on LZ Columbus. Some PAVN histories place the H-15 east of Plei Me and do not mention it in either battle.
26. Huan quoting Cuu, 101-103; Toan and Dinh, 32.
27. Moore and Galloway, 193.
28. Toan and Dinh, 32; Huan quoting Cuu, 102.
29. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 49; An and Duong, 39-40.
30. Toan and Dinh, 33; Moore and Galloway, 214.
31. Toan and Dinh, 33-34; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 49.
32. Moore and Galloway, 223.
33. Toan and Dinh, 34; Do Trung Mich, "66th Regiment Develops the Traditions and Lessons of the Plei Me Victory," *The Plei Me Victory*, 152.
34. Moore and Galloway, 224; Coleman, 241-42.
35. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 50.
36. Moore and Galloway, 233.
37. Toan and Dinh, 35; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 50; Linh, 117-18.
38. Toan and Dinh, 35-36.
39. Moore and Galloway, 112; Coleman, 210. While elements of the 33d might have been at LZ X-Ray, PAVN accounts indicate that most of the regiment was not.
40. Coleman, 248; Moore and Galloway, 233, 251-53.
41. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 51; Moore and Galloway, 258, 262; Coleman, 253.
42. Toan and Dinh, 36.
43. Ibid., 36-37.
44. Other, smaller NVA units might also have participated in the battle. See Moore and Galloway, 261, and [author not given] "Remembrances of the First Fight Against the Americans in the Central Highlands," *The Plei Me Victory*, 238-40.
45. Toan and Dinh, 37-39; Linh, 115; *The Plei Me Offensive*, 52-53.
46. Linh, 109-10.
47. Ibid., 40; Dung, 131.
48. Phuong, 44.
49. Moore and Galloway, 366, 373-74.
50. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 85; Mich, 155.
51. Coleman, 274-77.
52. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 54-55; Mich, 152.
53. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 55-56; Coleman, 278-79.
54. *The Plei Me Offensive*, 60-61.
55. Ibid., 69-70; Son, 205.
56. These included the 9th Battalion's battle of 14 November, the 7th Battalion's two attacks on 15 and 16 November, the LZ Albany fight and the LZ Columbus attack.
57. Dung, 126; *History of the People's Army*, 216 [no other publishing information given].
58. Coleman, 283; Moore and Galloway, 399.
59. Military History Institute of Vietnam, *The Saigon-Gia Dinh Offensive Theater* (1968), Hanoi, 1988, 86-87.

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MR Review Essay

The Luzon Campaign, 1944-1945: Two Windows

by Lieutenant Colonel Russell W. Ramsey, US Army Reserve, Retired

In 1996, in the Donovan Technical Library, Fort Benning, Georgia, I found some microfilm rolls half a century old. They contained the US 37th Infantry Division's daily unit operational summaries for April and May 1945, the time during which the Ohio National Guardsmen pushed north from Manila to Baguio in the Philippines. Many summary entries were signed "R.A. Ramsey, Lt Col, G-3"—my father. Having already published *On Law and Country*, Dad's biography and edited papers, I scrolled hastily through the old film to see if I had made any errors or noteworthy omissions.[1]

Not long afterward, John Ohl of Mesa Community College, Arizona, came to Fort Benning to do research on his biography of Major General (MG) Robert S. Beightler. Beightler successfully commanded the 37th "Buckeye" Division from its 1940

federalization through its demobilization in December 1945.[2]

When I received Ohl's final manuscript in early 2000 for comment, I was fortuitously aided by a review copy of Robert Ross Smith's classic, *Triumph in the Philippines*.[3] The complementary books reveal aspects of World War II not previously evaluated and highlight events and relationships that could occur again during the 21st century.

In his book, Ohl shows how honest biography can make for page-snapping reader interest without having to collaborate with "enhancement hacks." Beightler, a successful Ohio highway and construction engineer, had a sense of public service. Cast in the mold of the 19th-century US military engineers who tamed the frontier, Beightler studied Army tactics and organization and even attended the US Army War College, a rare thing for citizen soldiers.

Appointed Commanding General, 37th Infantry Division, Ohio National Guard (NG), over several senior candidates who had more political clout, Beightler was diplomatic but tough. Mobilized to Camp Shelby, Mississippi, Beightler drove the Ohio Guardsmen through conversion to the triangular division and the famed Louisiana Maneuver of 1941. Shipped to Indian Town Gap, Pennsylvania, for European deployment, then suddenly diverted to the Pacific Theater, the 37th did extensive jungle training on New Georgia, where Beightler quietly relieved and sent home the last politically appointed, incompetent officers.

On Bougainville in the Solomons, the 37th Division was a major land force fighting under MG Oscar W. Griswold's legendary 14th Corps. When the time came for the Luzon invasion, the 14th Corps was General Walter Krueger's 6th Army's main effort. Beightler's 37th Division was the Sunday-punch force that recaptured Manila, forcing the crossing of the Pasig River and the low-casualty recapture of the Spanish Intramuros "Walled City," where fanatical Japanese defenders held internees as human shields and hostages against attack.

When the 14th Corps turned northward to conquer northern Luzon, Beightler was faced with huge leadership challenges. Combat had ended in Europe, and no one knew of the impending use of two atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Bluntly put, no soldier in any war is enthralled with the idea of being the last casualty of an enemy who is obviously losing. Still, the 37th fought strongly until war's end. Beightler remained in the Philippines until his Ohioans were assured of transport home.

At a speech before his heavily decorated veterans on a cold night in late December 1945, in Columbus, Ohio, he thrilled my 10-year-old heart. Beightler was one of only two NG flag officers integrated into the Regular Army in grade because of their fabulous combat records. At that time, Regular Army officers were taking two-grade cuts in rank to remain aboard.

Beightler's biography is filled with vignettes showing the delicate line an officer must walk in the shadow of Cincinnatus, the legendary Roman militia hero that George Washington and the founding fathers admired. Ohl also shows how militia or citizen forces can only succeed if an officer of Beightler's no-nonsense commitment to training, maneuvers and personnel decisions based on military ability instead of political backing commands them.

After reading Ohl's biography of Beightler, one jumps easily into Smith's *Triumph in the Philippines*. First issued in 1961 and updated in 1993, the book comes with splendid maps in a packet. Smith is the writer who first and best portrays the difference between Lieutenant General (LTG) Robert L. Eichelberger's 8th Army in southern Luzon and islands farther below and General Walter Krueger's 6th Army lodged to the north on Luzon.

The 8th Army was a control headquarters for dozens of regiment- and battalion-size engagements, whereas the 6th Army fought on an integrated Army front similar to the 1st, 2d and 3d Armies in Western Europe. Smith emphasizes this point, unintentionally perhaps, as he discusses what happened when the 1st Cavalry Division moved from the 8th Army to the 6th Army, where it joined Griswold's 14th Corps and flanked the 37th Division in storming Manila. The news media have created the illusion of two divisions racing for bragging rights about who liberated Manila. In fact, the two divisions operated in adjacent sectors under the most experienced corps commander in the Pacific Theater.

The 37th Division was highly skilled in the types of operations the 8th Army undertook, but it was new to operations as part of a corps sector in an Army area of operations—the task of the 6th Army to which it belonged in Luzon. Further, the 37th Division assumed multiple, diverse tasks: an amphibious assault (Lingayen Gulf); a flat terrain advance on axis (to Manila); an urban-reduction operation on a European scale (Battle of Manila); another flat terrain advance (central Luzon); and a tortuous mountain campaign in totally unfamiliar terrain (to Baguio).

Ohl draws on 37th Division histories, field notes and interviews, and Smith corroborates every major military point in Beightler's biography. Smith sketches clearly but with less detail the delicate command relationships between regular Army and NG generals. And despite the thorny, egotistical portrait that most historians render of General Douglas MacArthur during the Luzon Campaign, both Ohl and Smith, in different ways, show that MacArthur successfully integrated disparate Army elements within the World War

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II theater that was always secondary to Europe and naval rather than terrestrial in strategic overview.

Smith does not say so in exact words, but he paves the way for Ohl's modest conclusions. Beightler was the Pacific Theater's most effective division commander, and the 37th Division was one of the most effective five or six divisions in either major theater of operations.

Since 21st-century Army combat mixes centralized and decentralized operations and blends professional with citizen-soldiers, military and national security professionals need to read and apply the lessons of these complementary books. Smith details the Luzon Campaign where these two mixes occurred; Ohl shows how one competent commander and the citizen soldiers he led produced victory. ***MR***

NOTES

1. Russell W. Ramsey, *On Law and Country* (Boston: Branden Publishers, 1992).
2. John Kennedy Ohl, *Minuteman: The Military Career of General Robert S. Beightler* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishing, 2000).
3. Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1993).

MR Book Reviews



JEFFERSON DAVIS'S GENERALS, Gabor S. Boritt, ed., Oxford University Press, NY, 1999, 213 pages, $27.50.

Gabor S. Boritt and the Oxford University Press have made a successful sideline of publishing relatively thin essays written by first-class authors about the Civil War. Therefore, a book about Jefferson Davis as Confederate commander in chief and his relationships with his senior subordinates was inevitable. This is not to say that *Jefferson Davis's Generals* is just a product of an editor and press on automatic pilot. As in other books in this series, Boritt has collected essays from acknowledged experts writing on their particular subjects of expertise: Craig Symonds on Joe Johnston, Emory Thomas on Robert E. Lee and Steven Woodworth on command in the Western theater.

The final entry in this compilation is by James McPherson, perhaps the greatest living Civil War historian. He too says nothing he has not said before, but a McPherson retread still remains very good indeed.

Michael Pearlman, ***Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

HUMAN BULLETS: A Soldier's Story of the Russo-Japanese War, Tadayoshi Sakurai, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1999, 270 pages, $15.00.

Human Bullets: A Soldier's Story of the Russo-Japanese War, Tadayoshi Sakurai's story of fighting for his country and his emperor, simply but strongly states his idealism and dedication. Sakurai's writing is gripping.

The war's adversity was tremendous. Yet, despite the rain, mud, leaking tents, poor food, constant shelling and attacks, and the loss of friends, Sakurai's morale remained high, and his willingness to serve never wavered.

In Japanese culture, a soldier departing for war considers himself already dead. The ceremony of a "last drink" focuses soldiers on their fate. The Japanese word for victory is the same as part of the word for dry chestnuts, so a soldier going to war is also given a chestnut for success.

The fear of failure and its accompanying shame are strong motivations in sustaining a soldier's courage. There is no discussion in this book as to the right or wrong of war. Sakurai writes of a soldier's obedience, trust in his superiors, willingness to sacrifice all for his country and respect for the enemy's fighting qualities.

MAJ William T. Bohne, ***USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas***

THANK GOD THEY'RE ON OUR SIDE: The United States & Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1921-1965, David F. Schmitz, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1999, 400 pages, $45.00.

Political strategies invariably require compromises, some of which involve accepting the lesser of any number of unsatisfying options that trigger endless speculation—"what if" or "if only." David F. Schmitz's *Thank God They're on Our Side* applies this approach to US foreign policy that between 1921 and 1965 supported right-wing dictatorships in developing countries.

Schmitz views such policies as a betrayal of the US commitment to freedom and democracy. He contends that policy makers consistently resorted to political expediency in favoring the political stability offered by authoritarian regimes over the more turbulent, less-predictable, democratically inspired revolutionary movements. As Schmitz sees it, the options were to endorse ruthless dictators, limit support to minimal diplomatic recognition or indirectly support democratic movements.

Schmitz sees US foreign policy

after World War I as being influenced by the threat of global communism. There is no doubt that the "Red scare," as well as US Senator Joseph McCarthy's 1950s inquisition, exaggerated the threat. However, recently available Soviet documents confirm that the threat was real.

Schmitz's assumptions that US support for autocratic leaders precluded the development of middle classes are more problematic. He argues that the absence of a middle class paved the way for communists and other extremists to take over nascent revolutionary movements. While this argument might have merit in Nicaragua, it is less obvious in Iran, Cuba, Brazil or Argentina, four cases that underpin his charge that misguided US policy brought these revolutionary movements to power. There is every likelihood that policy makers at the time believed granting or withholding favored aid provided leverage with legitimate, if less than ideal, governments and offered a more promising future for democratic prospects than either benign neglect or tacit support.

The results of policy choices are a matter of history; the outcome of choices not taken is necessarily speculative. Schmitz's book legitimately questions US foreign policy's effect on emerging democracies. An objective, thoughtful analysis of the rationale behind these decisions is long overdue. Unfortunately, this book fails to answer that need; Schmitz allows his personal bias to color his appraisal.

COL John W. Messer, ***USAR, Retired, Ludington, Michigan***

TO END A WAR, Richard Holbrooke, The Modern Library, New York, 1999, 410 pages, $27.95.

Richard Holbrooke's memoir, *To End a War*, is the story of the haggling that eventually produced the Dayton Accords. Support to peace operations is an essential task for the Army and one that will be a part of the spectrum of Army missions for years and probably decades. Operations to sustain and move refu-

Pass In Review

THE WAR: Stories of Life and Death From World War II, Clint Willis, ed., Thunder's Mouth Press, New York, 1999, 375 pages, $16.95.

Editor Clint Willis states that war memoirs with a "hollow, pseudohappy, sentimental ring" miss the truth found in more-serious writers' "suffering, guilt and anger." *The War* contains only passages Willis believes accurately portray this truth. His selections focus on war's dehumanizing aspects and the suffering it causes. However, the selections are so carefully screened I wondered whether the writers' views are accurately represented. This unbalanced approach encourages further study of the original writings.**—LTC David G. Rathgeber,** ***USMC, Quantico, Virginia***

1939: The Alliance That Never Was and the Coming of World War II, Michael Jabara Carley, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, IL, 1999, 321 pages, $28.95.

1939 examines European governments' failure to effectively counter Nazi Germany's expansionist policies from 1937 to 1939. The European situation demanded an effective alliance between France, Britain and Russia if Hitler was to be stopped. Unfortunately, Western European power brokers were more afraid of communism's spread than of Germany. Appeasement was the policy. The book's most exciting passages describe efforts by various leaders—the most famous being Winston Churchill—who opposed appeasement but whose voices were not heeded.**—LTC John A. Hardaway,** ***USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas***

CUSTER AND HIS COMMANDS: From West Point to Little Bighorn, Kurt Hamilton Cox, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999, 72 pages, $13.95.

Custer and His Commands, one of the latest in a pictorial series displaying US Army uniforms, weapons and equipment, brings to life the story of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, his family and friends, the units he commanded and the soldiers who served with him. However, the book—and others in the series—would be of greater value if they included more background information on the era portrayed. But readers interested in uniforms and equipment will find this book interesting.**—Richard L. Milligan,** ***Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

THE BRADLEY AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY: Technology, Institutions, and the Problem of Mechanized Infantry in the United States Army, W. Blair Haworth Jr., Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, 1999, 199 pages, $57.95.

Overall, *The Bradley and How It Got That Way* offers well-documented, balanced coverage of how the US Army struggled with the concept of a mechanized infantry, the doctrinal debates on its employment and the nature of its equipment. The book's thoroughness is an asset as well as a liability; the information-rich text often bogs down the reader in its comprehensive approach. Thus, the book will most likely appeal only to acquisition officers and history-minded mechanized infantrymen.**—MAJ Steven A. Smith,** ***USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

gees at the end of the Gulf War and operations in Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo are typical of those that followed the Cold War. Understanding how these missions develop at the national level is critical.

Holbrooke's book is his surprisingly honest perspective on the development of the Dayton Accords, despite the fact that he comes through as arrogant, acerbic, opinionated and not particularly fair. But Holbrooke does not claim objectivity. Since he was the architect of the Dayton Accords, his view is the one that counts and is indispensable to understanding how the peace we currently have in Bosnia evolved.

Just as every author has a point of view, so do reviewers. I led a brigade into Bosnia in December 1995 and therefore cannot pretend to be objective. My viewpoint stems from the conviction that it is soldiers' business to execute—not to determine—policy. Thus this review comes from a low-level executor of the policy Holbrooke developed.

Actual events at the peace conference make fascinating reading. Shuttling between belligerents, Holbrooke worked hard to find a solution that would assure Muslim survival and dissolve the Bosnian Serb republic. Holbrooke generously praises his colleagues and US General Wesley Clark.

Holbrooke is also clear that Slobodan Milosevic's willingness to cut loose his Serb colleagues in Bosnia proved central to reaching an accord. The Bosnian Serbs had no seat at the peace conference and fundamentally no voice. According to Holbrooke, Milosevic cut the deal at the Bosnian Serbs' expense and enjoyed playing power broker. Milosevic made concessions that brought Alia Izetbegovic back to the table after he had decided to break off talks.

Holbrooke's account of the actual conference is compelling, but his account of implementing peace seems more than a little unfair to the military units and commanders on the ground. According to Holbrooke, the implementation force (IFOR) could have used the "silver bullet" clause

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KIM IL-SONG'S NORTH KOREA, Helen-Louise Hunter, Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT, 1999, 262 pages, $45.00.

Kim Il-song's North Korea is a chilling look into the lives of citizens in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. The major themes pursue the cult of Kim Il-song and the role of *songbun*, which defines the social standing of every person in the Republic. After the communist revolution, all proletariat were promoted to the top of society, all bourgeois demoted. Kim Il-song rose to leadership within this society, connecting with his people as few leaders do. This book gives insight into how a powerful and charismatic ruler can influence a strictly layered society and is valuable to any military professional studying Korea.—**MAJ John M. Lynch,** ***USA, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii***

LEE'S ENDANGERED LEFT: The Civil War in Western Virginia, Spring of 1864, Richard R. Duncan, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1999, 340 pages, $29.95.

In spring 1864, the Union Army positioned to strike Confederate General Robert E. Lee's left flank. Grant's ultimate goal was to destroy railroads and canals, salt works, lead mines and agricultural crops vital to the South's cause. In *Lee's Endangered Left*, Robert R. Duncan admirably describes both armies' hardships when cut supply lines forced the armies to subsist off the land. In turn, civilians—Union and Confederate—suffered greatly as crops and livestock were confiscated for military use. Eventually Grant's forces were turned back, giving Lee's endangered forces a reprieve. Duncan covers numerous aspects of the campaign in this informative and highly readable book.—**COL C. E. Hatch,** ***USMC, Retired, Foster, Oklahoma***

DEMOCRACY BY FORCE: US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Karin von Hippel, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2000, 224 pages, $49.95.

Democracy by Force provides excellent insight into success and failure in US post-Cold War nation-building efforts. Karin Von Hipple analyzes US policy strengths and weaknesses in an effort to provide an understanding of the conditions under which military intervention and nation building are most likely to succeed. She examines US efforts in four post-Cold War interventions: Panama, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. By looking at the relationships between the Department of Defense (DOD) and civilian agencies, she concludes that for successful nation building operations, the military should focus on security, coordination and logistics; civilian agencies should focus on nation building. This book provides a perspective into the intricate web between DOD and civilian agencies and is a valuable tool for the military professional who must interact in a military intervention followed by nation building.—**MAJ William Pleasant Isler Jr.,** ***USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas***

in the military section of the treaty to do anything it liked. While there is some truth in this assertion, the clause clearly does not stipulate military responsibility for civilian implementation. One lesson from Bosnia is that only in the early days of this kind of operation does the military have the resources to move the process forward.

No matter how the peace turns out ultimately, Holbrooke's book is important for understanding how the policy was developed. If sometimes the participants do not seem admirable, it is important to remember the work is hard and dirty.

COL Gregory Fontenot, *USA, Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas*

DISCOVERING CHINESE NATIONALISM IN CHINA: Modernization, Identity and International Relations, Yongnian Zheng, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999, 189 pages, $64.95.

Writing this review in the aftermath of the NATO bombing of China's Belgrade Embassy and US charges of Chinese atomic espionage, brings nationalism, as Yongnian Zheng defines and discusses it, to the fore in almost every conversation about Chinese foreign policy. *Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity and International Relations*, is a concise, trenchant examination of historic and contemporary Chinese nationalism. Zheng examines this phenomenon from several views based on a close reading of the Chinese press and opinion journals. His discussion is informed by his knowledge of Chinese nationalism and xenophobia.

Although Zheng is a political scientist, he eschews systems-oriented, model-driven, quantitative research in this work. Instead, he returns to an older analytic school that examines a political system in its own context and evaluates it in relation to the wider world. The context is necessarily historical. Zheng shows how different interpretations of the past interact to create present and possible futures.

In the final chapter, Zheng summarizes his ideas and speculates on future Chinese foreign policy as influenced by the new nationalism. Using Albert Hirschman's terms to describe political strategy—"voice," "exit" and "loyalty"—Zheng explains why he believes China's leaders will choose "voice" by which to find wealth and power and become more engaged in the international system.

Lewis Bernstein, *Historian, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*



"HIM ON ONE SIDE AND ME ON THE OTHER": The Civil War Letters of Alexander Campbell, 79th New York Infantry Regiment, and James Campbell, 1st South Carolina Battalion, Terry A. Johnston Jr., ed., University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, 1999, 190 pages, $24.95.

"Him on One Side and Me on the Other," a wonderful book, is a unique addition to any collection of first-person Civil War accounts. James and Alexander Campbell, native to Ireland, immigrated to the United States several years before the war. Alexander settled in New York City where he became a stonecutter. James settled in Charleston, South Carolina, where he became prominent in the community and growing commercial middle class. Both prospered until war interrupted their lives.

Alexander's letters, predominantly written to his wife, give a spectacular view of army life in the field. He describes camps, marches and food. He becomes a sergeant in the color guard, one of the regiment's most honored and dangerous positions, and his apprehension mounts when

MR Letters

Battlefield Chaos

I read Major Charles A. Pfaff's article "Chaos, Complexity and the Battlefield" in the July-August 2000 issue of *Military Review* and agree with Pfaff that modern information-gathering technologies have made the battlefield more chaotic. The original intent was to simplify or streamline information flow.

I disagree with Pfaff's statement that "[o]n a battlefield where small changes can have dramatic and unpredictable effects, commanders must remain flexible, ideally with fully resourced contingency plans that account for enemy responses and effects throughout the system. Contingency plans are therefore important for maneuver and support units at all levels."

If the commander must react to the enemy; that is, manage chaos, his staff can plan multiple contingencies. But, will the commander use them? The answer depends on what type of variable the enemy throws into the equation. The next question is, will the commander have time to rehearse the contingency plans? Probably not.

Contingency plans are an important part of planning. However, if we cannot predict "where small changes can have dramatic and unpredictable effects," what good are multiple contingencies? We would be better off just following standing operating procedures and letting commanders "adjust fire" to manage the chaotic battlefield.

CPT William A. Martin, *US Army, Giessen, Germany*

his regiment faces his Confederate brother's unit at Secessionville, South Carolina. That realization gives a firsthand understanding of the sobriquet "brother against brother."

James Campbell's letters are addressed to Alexander. James had enlisted in a prewar militia unit, the Union Light Infantry, which became part of the 1st South Carolina Infantry Battalion in March 1862. He served with distinction and rose to second lieutenant. James was captured while defending Battery Wagner on Morris Island in Charleston Harbor in July 1863 and spent the rest of the war in Union prisons.

The only drawback to this fine book is that James's letters are mundane because of prison restrictions and censorship. The letters are mostly about family matters and give little insight into actual prison life or life in the Confederate Army before his imprisonment. His letters could have been a virtual gold mine had they have been of the same caliber as Alexander's. However, this disparity does not detract from the book; readers will enjoy this superb, enlightening look at the soldiers' lives.

COL James L. Speicher, *USA,*
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

1001 THINGS EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE CIVIL WAR, Frank E. Vandiver, Doubleday, New York, 1999, 276 pages, $24.95.

1001 Things Everyone Should Know About the Civil War is a good reference book for the War Between the States—the name sanctioned officially by Congress. To maintain some semblance of order, author Frank E. Vandiver has divided the book into a lineal progression of the war years. The style is easy to follow and maintains the reader's attention as it wends through a variety of topics.

The book is not without faults. Although editing errors do not detract from readability, factual errors could have been prevented. For example, Jefferson Davis's birthplace is not Mississippi, but Kentucky; the name of the school that began at Fort Leavenworth in 1881 was not the "Command School" but the "School of Application of Infantry and Cavalry"; Pickett did not charge on the second day of Gettysburg, but the third. While these errors do not degrade the book's overall content, they certainly do not make for a polished product.

Vandiver's treatment of black Confederates conforms to long-standing stereotypes despite the amount of new material being published regarding this subject. Many prominent black historians show that blacks served with the Confederate Army in armed, combatant roles in numbers too large to conveniently ignore. While Vandiver is technically correct about blacks not being "in" the Confederate Army until 1865, they were active combatants from the beginning. This politically incorrect view is backed by numerous firsthand accounts.

This book is a good primer for the beginner and an excellent refresher for the veteran. It ties disparate events and people into a manageable whole.

LTC Edwin L. Kennedy Jr, *USA,*
Retired, Leavenworth, Kansas



FIRE IN THE NIGHT: Wingate of Burma, Ethiopia, and Zion, John Bierman and Colin Smith, Random House, NY, 1999, 434 pages, $29.95.

The life and career of World War II-era British Major General Orde Wingate still excites controversy. To some, Wingate was a brilliant eccentric whose pioneering work organizing special night squads in prewar Palestine, native militia forces in World War II Ethiopia and long-range penetration groups—*chindits*—in Burma mark him as one the true forefathers of modern special operations.

To his critics, Wingate's forces produced few tactical victories and contributed little to operational or strategic success. To his fans, Wingate was a gadfly who restored initiative and energy to his units and a visionary who accurately foresaw the shape of future wars. His critics counter that Wingate was a shameless self-promoter whose antics created antagonism that detracted from overall mission accomplishment. His premature death in Burma in 1944 gave his life a tragic aura of greatness cut down in its prime—or just short of it.

John Bierman and Colin Smith, British authors with wide experience in Wingate's operating locales, recapture the Wingate debate in *Fire in the Night: Wingate of Burma, Ethiopia, and Zion*. Although Wingate's story has been told many times, Bierman and Smith are the first to draw on recently released personal papers. The authors also summarize well the "battle of memoirs" already published by Wingate's contemporaries and draw on a final round of testimony by aging warriors and friends who knew him personally.

Bierman and Smith, though not afraid to be critical, sympathize with Wingate's ability to break through bureaucratic sloth and tactical inertia to get things done. Wingate's willingness to criticize and risk the dislike of his peers and superiors, combined with his vision and energy, were welcome antidotes to the clubby, business-as-usual attitude of many British officers.

The authors emphasize that the British army was as closed-minded and resistant to change as any army. However, they repeatedly point out that Wingate might have accomplished little without his pattern of persistently calling on favors from politicians and relatives in high places, whose good graces Wingate

assiduously courted. This pattern established itself early in his career; the greatest example is Wingate's garnering Prime Minister Winston Churchill's support for the Burma campaigns.

Therein lies *Fire in the Night's* greatest theme: the potential and limitations for any one man to reshape military doctrine, organization and tactics to meet rapidly changing tactical, operational and even strategic scenarios. Bierman and Smith deserve congratulations for bringing the Wingate story to life for a new generation.

MAJ Peter Molin, *USA, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

A TIME FOR SPIES: Theodore Stephanovich Mally and the Era of the Great Illegals, William E. Duff, Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, TN, 1999, 231 pages, $27.00.

A *Time for Spies* is a good book that lights a shadowed corner in the world of espionage. William Duff is a retired FBI special counterintelligence agent whose job was documenting and forecasting the behavior of Soviet agents and their unique colleagues—the illegals. An illegal is any individual conducting espionage under a false identity in a foreign land. An illegal runs great risks including arrest and criminal sanctions.

The great era of illegals encompassed the years between World Wars I and II. The illegals functioned from Brazil to Germany and from the United States to Great Britain, serving primarily with the Fourth Directorate of the Soviet Military Intelligence and the Foreign Department of State Security (KGB) and the Communist International (COMINTERN). Administratively, they were in one or the other; in reality, they worked off and on in each. They were highly intelligent, educated or both and were believers in world revolution after World War I's disillusioning losses and displacement.

Their missions were many. They established mechanisms for sabotage and supported local communists to weaken potential foreign enemies, recruiting agents who would provide information or effect policies to benefit the "homeland of socialism." Duff focuses on Theodore Stephanovich Mally because of Mally's eventual role recruiting for and initially developing the influential Cambridge Network.

Mally's story provides insight into non-Russian illegals' almost-religious experience. Why did they accept Marxist and Leninist doctrines with such fervor? Even when Joseph Stalin was ruthlessly purging the intelligence service of the old guard, the illegals went to their doom believing their deaths would contribute to mankind's eventual salvation.

A *Time for Spies* is well written, based on solid documentation and toward the end has the drama of a spy novel. It is an excellent contribution to the intelligence field.

Peter Charles Unsinger, ***San Jose State University, California***